Clean up netstack README and TODO situation.

This commit is contained in:
Tony Garnock-Jones 2016-08-16 09:39:27 -04:00
parent 426a38b17f
commit 4beb281a2d
4 changed files with 19 additions and 34 deletions

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# TCP/IP Stack
There are two (closely-related) implementations here:
- [`monolithic-lowlevel`](monolithic-lowlevel/) is the original
implementation, originally written for `minimart`, a language that
followed our ESOP 2014 paper quite closely. Porting it to a
monolithic-assertion-set Syndicate dialect helped substantially
simplify the code.
- [`incremental-highlevel`](incremental-highlevel/) is a port of
`monolithic-lowlevel` to the Syndicate high-level DSL
("`syndicate/actor`"). Moving from the low-level Syndicate style to
the high-level style also drastically simplified the code.
## Linux Firewall Configuration
Imagine a setup where the machine you are running this code has IP

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- SACK
- Window scaling
Check that we handle the situations in figs. 9, 10, 11, pp.33- of RFC 793.
Bugs:
- RST kills a connection even if its sequence number is bogus. Check
to make sure it's in the window. (See
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/41848.pdf
and RFC 5961)
Conform better to the rules for reset generation and processing
from pp.36- of RFC 793. In particular, do not blindly accept RSTs
without checking sequence numbers against windows etc.

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# TCP/IP Stack
## Linux Firewall Configuration
Imagine a setup where the machine you are running this code has IP
192.168.1.10. This code claims 192.168.1.222 for itself. Now, pinging
192.168.1.222 from some other machine, say 192.168.1.99, will cause
the local kernel to receive the pings and then *forward them on to
192.168.1.222*, which because of the gratuitous ARP announcement, it
knows to be on its own Ethernet MAC address. This causes the ping
requests to repeat endlessly, each time with one lower TTL.
One approach to solving the problem is to prevent the kernel from
forwarding packets addressed to 192.168.1.222. To do this,
sudo iptables -I FORWARD -d 192.168.1.222 -j DROP

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Ideas on TCP unit testing:
<https://www.snellman.net/blog/archive/2015-07-09-unit-testing-a-tcp-stack/>
Check behaviour around TCP zero-window probing. Is the correct
behaviour already a consequence of the way `send-outbound` works?
Do something smarter with TCP timers and RTT estimation than the
nothing that's already being done.
TCP options negotiation.
- SACK
- Window scaling
Bugs:
- RST kills a connection even if its sequence number is bogus. Check
to make sure it's in the window. (See
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/41848.pdf
and RFC 5961)